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ABSTRACT
This is the first part of a three-partpaper on research on the elderly.
The objective of the paper is topresent issues and research results in three
areas: economic status, retirement, and consumption andsaving. This part
covers background material on demographic change,living arrangements, income
growth and labor force participation, and researchon economic Status.
The major areas of research on economic statusare: adjustments to
observed income to bring it closer to a welfaremeasure with the objective of
understanding whether the elderly are better off than thenonelderly; the
distribution of income among the elderly and inparticular the extent and causes
of the high poverty level of elderly widows; wealthholdings, especially




Stony Brook, NY 117941. Introduction
Research by economists on the elderly hasgrown rapidly since the 1978
review on the economics of aging in this Journal (RobertClark, Juanita Kreps
and Joseph Spengler, 1978). An important reason for thisgrowth is demographic
change. In 1900 just 4% of the population was elderly (65or older). By 1980
the elderly were 11% of the population and theyare projected to rise to 22% in
2040. Although each age group has its own productivecapacities and demands,
the capacities and demands of the elderly arevery different from the rest of
the population, so the large demographic changes will havea substantial impact
on society. For example, because few elderly work, theirconsumption must be
financed either through their own savings or through socialprograms: The
demographic changes are bound to put stress on capital markets and social
institutions. Each age group faces uncertainty, but theconsequences of
uncertainty for the elderly are probably larger than for otherage groups simply
because they have fewer remaining years over which tospread windfall gains or
losses. Furthermore, they have fewer responses tounexpected events. For
example, many retired elderly cannot return to the work force inresponse to an
unanticipated drop in income.
A second reason for the increase in research on the elderly has been the
availability of data that can be used to study and test some basic economic
models. Retirement is an aspect of labor supply. The SocialSecurity system
and pensions offer economic incentives that are different from the labor market
incentives offered earlier in life. The response of workers of retirementage
can provide information about the tradeoff between goods and leisure which can
complement knowledge gained from studying the labor supply of younger workers.
The study of the consumption behavior of workers has been difficult because
their main asset, human capital, is not observed. The main assets of the
1retired elderly (financial assets, housing and claims on retirement programs).
however, are observed. Study is further simplified because the utility of
retired individuals only depends on consumption, whereas the utility of workers
depends on consumption and leisure. Therefore, only the intertemporal aspects
of utility maximization need to be considered, not the intratemporal aspects.
In life cycle models, consumption depends on the interest rate and on mortality
rates, as well as on assets. But variation in interest rates acrossindividuals
is typically not observed, and, among younger people, variation in mortality
rates from person to person is so small that any effect is absorbedin the
constant parameters of a consumption model. The mortality rates of the elderly
are substantial, and they vary considerably by age and by sex.The variation
can econometrically identify important utility function parameters.
The demographic changes and the research questions would have attracted
much less attention, however, had it not been for the Retirement History Survey
(RHS). THE LUIS is a ten-year longitudinal survey of 11,153 householdswhose
heads who were 58-63 in 1969. Every two years the heads (or their spousesif
the head had died) were questioned about income, assets, employment, health,and
social and family interactions. Most importantly, the official Social Security
earnings records were attached to the survey data. From them,each person's
Social Security eligibility and benefits can be calculated exactly. In
principle, this provides the necessary data to estimate the effectsof Social
Security on retirement. The earnings records can also be used toform a good
estimate of lifetime earnings, which is almost necessary in any study of
lifetime wealth accumulation. The RHS has proven to be an invaluable resource:
many results to be discussed in this paper arederived from the RES data.
The main goal of this paper is to present and analyze some major research
questions and findings. The research falls in three main areas:economic
status of the elderly, retirement, and consumption and saving behavior.Health,
2which is properly the subject of an entirepaper, and social and family
relationships are only mentioned in connection with the topicscovered.
Because the analysis will often refer to recent economicand demographic
changes, the next section will use widely available data onpopulation, life
epeetancy, living arrangements, labor force participation, and incometo
provide background for the discussion of the research.
2.Demographic and Economic Changes.
Between 1900 and 1980 the proportion of the population thatwas elderly
increased from 4% to 11% (Table 1). The proportion 85 andover increased from a
fraction of a percent to 1%, which is about 2 millionpeople. Population
forecasts, which should be quite accurate over the next 30years, show large
increases in the fraction of the population that is old.By 2050, 6% (16
million people) of the population will be 85 orover; about eight million
people will be 90 or over. Thus between 1980 and 2050 the number aged 85 and
over is expected to increase by a factor of eight.
Part of the change in the age distribution is due to a long-term fall in
birth rates, which, by itself, would have gradually increased theaverage age.
Part of the large projected increase in the elderly is due to thebaby-boom
cohort (1946 to 1964). The fattest part of this bulge in the population will be
65 in 2020 and 95 in 2050. Mortality rates have fallen sharply,contributing to
the change in age distribution: in 1900 lifeexpectancy at birth of males and
females was 46 and 49 years respectively; in 1980 it was 70 and 78.
Life expectancy, conditional on reaching 65, is forecast to continue to
increase (Table 2). If there is no change in theaverage retirement age, the
fraction of life spent in retirement will increase. Financing more consumption
from a shorter worklife will strain the savings of each retiredperson. The
3problem for society is greater because the probability that an individual will
reach 65 will continue to increase and the number of individuals in the cohorts
approaching 65 will rise. Therefore, the fraction of output consumed by the
retired will increase substantially. This will affect not only Social Security
and private pensions but capital markets as the retired convert their savings
intoconsumption.
At the turn of the century, the conditional life expectancies of men and
women were practically the same. By 1980 a 65 year-old woman could expect to
live 4.2 years more than a 65 year-old man. The difference is forecast to
continue to increase slowly. Beyond the more obvious impacts on Social Security
and pensions, the differences in life expectancy mean that most of the very old
are widows. Because the very old must finance a long lifetime of consumption,
it is likely that they will have few assets toward the end of their lives.
Therefore, in the absence of social programs, the longer lifetimes of women will
lead to high rates of poverty among widows. As will be discussed below, elderly
widows have substantially higher poverty rates than others; the population
forecasts give no suggestion that demographic changes by themselves will reduce
the rates.
Higher mortality rates of men affect the living arrangements of the
elderly. In 1985, 53% of the elderly lived with a spouse, but the distribution
was very different for men and women: 75% of elderly men lived with their wives
while only 38% of elderly women lived with their husbands (Table 3)1
Differences in living arrangements by age were much smaller among men than among
women because most wives outlive their husbands. For example, 49% of women aged
65-74 lived with their spouses compared with 23% of women aged 75+. Most of the
women not living with spouses would be widows. Of that group about two-thirds
lived alone. Comparisons over time show a small increase in the fraction of
elderly men living with a spouse (probably due to the increase in the life
4expectancy of women), and a modest increase in the fraction living alone.
Among
women the changes were much greater: 24% lived alone 1960, 41% in1985. The
fraction living with relatives fell from 34% to 18%. Thelargest changes were
among women 75 and over: during the 25 years the fraction living alone almost
doubled from 26% to 50%; the fraction living with relativesfell from 46% to
25%. The trend from living with relatives to living alonewas due, at least
partly, to rising economic resources (Robert Michael, Victor Fuchs and Sharon
Scott, 1980; Karen Holden, 1986; Saul Schwartz, Sheldon Danziger andEugene
Smolensky, 1984). If incomes are stable in the future, a continuing increase in
the difference in life expectancies, as forecast in Table3, implies that about
half of elderly women will live alone.
The average real income of the elderly, as conventionally measured in the
Current Population Survey, increased by about 29% between 1970 and 1986(Table
4), with more than half of the increase coming between 1970 and 1975. Themean
income of the entire population increased by only 8.5%, so that the income of
the the elderly relative to the entire population rose from 0.54 to 0.64. As
will be discussed below, this income measure is far from what economists would
call a full income measure, and it makes no provision for differences in
household size. Nonetheless, the figures give a good indication of the relative
income gain of the elderly.
The income growth of the elderly was accompanied by rather large changes in
the source of income as shown in Table 5. Income from earnings fell from 29% of
total income in 1967 to 17% in 1986. The fraction of income from Social
Security and pensions increased from 49% to 54%, mostly due to increases in
Social Security. Income from assets increased substantially but, as to be
discussed below, assets are so highly concentrated that the change was not
important for many of the elderly
Table 6 gives the distribution of elderly households according to the
5fraction of each household's income from various sources. For example, in 1971,
69% of elderly households had no earnings, 16% had from 1% to 49% of their
income from earnings, and 15% had 50% to 100% of their income from earnings.
The table shows that by 1986, 81% of elderly households had no income from
earnings, and that just 8% had more than half of their income fromearnings.@2
The percentage of households having no income from Social Security dropped
from 13% in 1971 to 8% in 1986. This change is partly due to increasing
coverage of Social Security. It is also due toearlier retirement: under the
Social Security law, few full-time workers would receive Social Security
benefits, so as participation rates fell, the fraction receiving Social Security
benefits rose. The importance of Social Security to most elderly can hardly be
overstated: in 1986 57% had more than half of their income from Social
Security, and 24% had more than 90%.
Although the fraction of the elderly with income from public and private
pensions and annuities (almost all pensions) has increased, pensions arestill a
modest source of income. In 1986, only 26% had private pension income; about
13% had government pensions. These figures imply that, at most, 39% of
households had some pension income. Even among those with pension income, few
households had a large fraction of their income from pensions: just 7% of
households had more than 50% of their income from either private or public
pensions. Again, 57% of households had more than half of their incomefrom
Social Security.
Table 6 confirms that asset income (which does not include any imputed
income to housing equity) has become more important; yet, in 1986 40% of
households had no income from assets, and 70% of households had less than 20% of
their income from assets. These figures accord with findings to be reported
later that many households retire with practically no financial savings.
Although asset income was 26% of total income (Table 5), most householdshad
6small amounts from assets, reflecting the highly skewed distribution of wealth.
The decrease in the importance of earnings is reflected in changes in labor
force participation, which for the elderly, is practically synonymous with
retirement. The changes in participation are large: between 1950 and 1987 the
participation rate of elderly men fell from 46% to 16%. In comparison, the
participation rate of the population increase from 60% to 66%, due to increased
participation by women. The fall in participation has been greatest at the most
advanced ages, but even at younger ages it has been substantial (Table 7). For
example, the participation rate of men 55-59 fell between 1957 and 1987 from
91.4% to 79.7%.
The normal retirement age of men, which at one time was 65 or even older,
is now less than 65 Many men retire in their late 50's. Among women two
opposite trends, earlier retirement and higher lifetime participation rates,
have kept the participation rates of 60-64 and 65-69 years olds approximately
constant. A way to isolate the trend to earlier retirement is to calculate the
retirement hazard rate, which is the probability of retirement at age T given
labor force participation at age T-l. A rough calculation of the retirement
hazard rate can be made from the participation rates of Table 7 by assuming that
the cross-section participation probabilities are the same as the participation
probabilities as an individual ages.
Retirement Hazard Rates
Men Women
55-59 to 60-64 to 55-59 to 60-64 to
Year 60-64 65-69 60-64 65-69
1957 .093 .366 .207 .422
1987 .311 .530 .364 .569
7Source: Author's calculations based on Table 7
According to this method of calculation, in 1957 the probabilityof retiring at
ages 60-64 given labor force participationat ages 55-59 was 0.093 for men and
0.207 for women. Thus, even among the small number of womenwho were in the
labor force later in life the retirement probabilities were higherthan the
retirement probabilities of men. The retirement hazardsof men increased more
so that by 1987 the hazards of men and women wereabout the same.
The data discussed in this section show large changes in the demographic
structure of the population, and in the income, labor force participation,and
living arrangements of the elderly. Some of theresearch to be reviewed in the
rest of the paper will aim at understanding the consequencesof these changes,
and some will aim at learning the causes of the changes.
3. Economic Status
The broad goals of the research on economic status have been tofind better
measures of economic well-being than simple income statistics,and to use the
measures to determine whether the economic status ofthe elderly has improved
over time, whether it has improved faster than theeconomic status of the
nonelderly, and whether it is higher than the economic statusof the nonelderly.
The ultimate social usefulness of the work is to assess whetherthe system of
transfers from the nonelderly to the elderly is adequate. Broadly speaking,the
work has immediate policy implications. For example, itcould be used to help
decide how much of the rising Medicare and Medicaid costsshould be borne by the
elderly and how much by the nonelderly.
Some of the research is concerned with measurement:how to impute income
flows from nonmoney sources such as housing, and Medicareand Medicaid, and how
8to adjust for taxes and underreporting of income. Other research aims to find
welfare measures from income: how to adjust for family size and compositionto
account for need. Considerable work has been aimed at distributional aspects of
income, in particular, at poverty. Some work has been done on wealth measures
of well being, but limitations of data and comparability with the nonelderly
limit its application.3
3.1 Trends in Income
No single study has an income series with all the household size
adjustments and adjustments to income that are desired. Therefore, I first give
results that are based on the consistent application of one particular size
adjustment. The similarity of method over years should increase our confidence
in the observed trends. Then, I give results for a single year that incorporate
all the adjustments. Provided there is stability of the effects of the
adjustments, the two approaches taken together should give a good idea of the
fully adjusted trends.
Table 8 shows annual growth rates in income and the level of income in 1984
adjusted for household size according to the official poverty index.4 In this
scaling, one nonelderly person has a weight of 1.024, two nonelderly persons
1.322, three persons (either elderly or nonelderly) 1.568 and so forth.5
Elderly persons are given slightly smaller weights (about 8% smaller than the
nonelderly). Size-adjusted income (income per equivalent person) is household
income divided by the household weight. The scaling embodies the assumption of
substantial returns to scale in household consumption: a two-person nonelderly
household requires only 29% more income than a one-person household. This
scaling yields income measures that are closer to income per household than to
income per person: income per household has an implicit weight of 1.0 for all
9households whereas income per person is based on assigning a weightof 1.0 to
each person.
The average elderly family unit is smaller than the average nonelderly
family unit (1.7 persons per household versus 3.0 personsin 1980), so the size
adjustments will raise the income measure ofthe elderly relative to the
nonelderly. In Table 8 the ratio of incomes of the nonelderly tothe elderly
was 0.67 in 1984 with no size adjustment; the ratio was0.87 with the size
adjustment. Average family size has decreased overtime, but it has decreased
more for the nonelderly than for the elderly. Therefore,the size adjustment
will produce a larger increase in income per equivalent personof the nonelderly
than of the elderly. For example, the size adjustment increasedthe annual rate
of growth of income between 1979 and 1984 by 0.9% for the nonelderlybut by just
0.3% for the elderly.
By either the unadjusted or adjusted income measurethe elderly had much
higher rates of growth of income than the nonelderly.These differences
cumulate over a number of years to give quite different income changes.For
example the total income changes from 1967 to 1984 are




The growth of income of the nonelderly has come from increasedwork effort,6
whereas earnings of the elderly have fallen as their labor force participation
rates declined.
Table 8 shows that, after adjusting for size, in most cases income growth
10increased with age. This is partly due to the aging of younger, more wealthy
cohorts and partly due to increases in Social Security, which are relatively
more important to the very old. Still, as measured in Table 8, by 1984 the
incomes of the most elderly were still lower than the incomes of any age group.
Table 9 indicates that incomes of the elderly increased throughout the
income distribution.7 In the second decile their incomes grew rapidly during
the first time period, possibly due to large across-the-board increases in
Social Security benefits. They continued to grow in the second time period,
although at a slower rate. Total growth over both periods was about 84%. The
nonelderly in the second decile had much less growth during the first period,
and their incomes fell substantially during the second period. The difference
in the experience of the nonelderly and the elderly is clearly shown by the
sharp break in growth rates at ages 60-64. Total income growth of the
nonelderly over both periods was very close to zero.
The elderly in the ninth decile had consistent income growth, but overall
(1967-1984) it was less than the elderly in the second decile: 49% compared
with 84%. The nonelderly in the ninth percentile also had income growth over
both periods, and, although there were some differences in each period, total
growth was not much different from the income growth of the elderly in the ninth
decile. It was much different, however, from the income growth of the
nonelderly in the second decile.
The general impression from the table is that the poorer elderly have done
much better than the poorer nonelderly, especially between 1979 and 1984.
Incomes of the well-to-do elderly have increased sharply in recent years,
probably due to the increase in asset income noted in Tables 5 and 6. Between
1969 and 1984 income inequality among the nonelderly seems to have increased,
particularly from 1979 to 1984. From 1969 to 1984 income inequality among the
elderly probably decreased, but not from 1979 to 1984.
11The income growth in Tables 8 and 9 include cohort effects: changeswithin
an age group are not those of any individual or group.The following table
roughly eliminates cohort effects by giving the income (1982$)of the cohort
born in 1898-1903.
Year Mean Income Median Income
1967; 65-69 11,095 7,810
1979; 75-79 10,847 7,807
1984; 80-84 11,469 7,843
Source: Radner, 1986.
In 1967, when this cohort was 65-69 years old, its mean real income was
$11,095; in 1979, when it was 75-79 years old, its mean real income was
$10,847. Some may find the stability of income surprising in viewof the high
rates of inflation during the 1970's. At one time it was generally thoughtthat
the elderly live on fixed incomes and are vulnerable to inflation; butthese
figures suggest the income of the elderly is effectivelyindexed.
The stability between 1967 and 1979 is not a reliable indicator of income
indexing because of two countervailing changes: earningswould have dropped
because of the trend toward earlier retirement; Social Security benefitswould
have increased due to changes in the benefit schedule in the early partof the
1970's. However, the stability between 1979 and 1984, when the CPI increased by
43%, certainly indicates effective indexing.8Just why income should be
effectively indexed is not apparent from the distribution of income by source
shown in Table 5. At least part of pension income and part of asset income are
not indexed, so thattotal income is not completely indexed. Detailed studyof
income in the RRS, however, confirms that incomes of individuals were stable
12during the l970s, a period of high and variable inflation (Burkhauser, Holden
and Feaster, 1988).Apparently the unindexed parts of income were small and
concentrated among a few individuals.
A different method of finding inflation vulnerability is based on how the
value of assets (including the present value of income flows such as Social
Security) is expected to change when inflation changes (Hurd and Shoven, 1985).
For example, long-term nominal bonds are vulnerable to changes in the inflation
rate whereas housing wealth is not. According to this measure of inflation
vulnerability, very few of the elderly would be affected substantially by a
change in inflation. This implies that the real value of the income flows from
the assets will not change with changes in inflation, which is consistent with
the effective indexing of income in the table.
3.2. Income comparisons.
-
Theaim of the research on income comparisons is to understand better the
economic status of the elderly compared with the nonelderly. Its method is to
bring income measures closer to welfare measures by adjusting income for
nonmoney components, underreporting and taxes, and by scaling for family size.
Table 10 shows the ratio of average income of the elderly to the nonelderly-
for several different income measures and for several size adjustments.
Conventional income is the usual income measure from the Current Population
Surveys; according to conventional income elderly households had just 52% of
the income of nonelderly households in 1971. Line B shows income adjusted for
the value of in-kind transfers, implicit income from housing, employment-related
benefits and direct taxes. These changes are important. In-kind transfers
increased the incomes of the elderly by $1430 per household, $1344 of which is
the market value of the transfers they receive on average through the Medicare
13and Medicaid programs. The elderly have lower tax ratesthan the nonelderly,
even holding income constant. They hold more housing equity.The effect of all
these adjustments is to increase incomes of the elderly byabout 12%. The most
important changes for the nonelderly are taxes,and work-related benefits.
These changes decrease average income by 10%. As a result, asshown in line B,
the ratio of household incomes increases to 0.65.
Adjusted income in Table 10 differs from income in two ways.The most
important difference is due to underreportingof income: according to a
validation study of survey data, the nonelderly underreport on average byabout
3%, but the elderly underreport by about 37%, mainly propertyincome (Radner,
1983). This adjustment, which is done for each income source at the household
level, substantially increases the income ratios. The other adjustmentchanges
the method of valuing the noninoney transfers in line B: they arevalued at an
estimate of what the recipient would be willing to pay for them (recipient
value) ,ratherthan at the cost to the provider (market value). The recipient
value is less than the market value especially for the poor. This adjustment
lowers the income ratio due to the large transfers through the Medicare/Medicaid
system, but the change is minor compared withthe change for income
underreporting.
The table has three different adjustments to household incomefor household
size and composition. The aim is to bring household income closer to an
individual welfare measure by dividing income by a suitable index. Theindex
used in calculating per capita income is, of course, just the numberof people
in the household. It embodies the assumption that there are no returnsto scale
in household consumption. The poverty line index is based on the povertyscale;
it was used in the size adjustments in Table 8. It implies substantial returns
to scale: according to this index, if a single elderly malehas a consumption
weight of 1.0, a husband and wife have a consumption weightof 1.26. That is,
14the couple would be deemed to be as well off as the single male if their income
was 26% greater. The budget share index was estimated from observed variation
in consumption patterns as family composition varied in the 1972-73 Consumer
Expenditure Survey (van der Caag and Smolensky, 1982). At least conceptually
this is the best of the indices of household size. Compared with the poverty
scale it has more modest returns to scale in consumption: according to this
index an elderly husband and wife need about 37% more income than a single male.
In my view line B is a better income-based measure of welfare because it is
more inclusive. In principle, adjusted income is superior to income, although
the adjustment for underreporting only makes sense on average: the
underreporting is mainly associated with property income which is highly
concentrated. As a rough welfare measure, household income is too high, as it
implies it is costless to add additional individuals to a household. Per capita
income is too low because it bars any returns to scale. The poverty line index
is not based on any observed behavior or theoretical model. That leaves the
budget share measure. The income and adjusted-income ratios are 1.04 and 1.28
respectively, implying that in 1979 the elderly were at least as well off on
average as the nonelderly, and possibly better off.
The results in Table 10, which are based on detailed analysis of 1979 CPS
data, can be updated by applying the observed growth in CPS income. According
to the Cl'S, the ratio of mean incomes of the elderly to the nonelderly increased
by 12.3% between 1979 and 1986. If all the components and adjustments to income
of Table 10 grew at the same relative rate, the income ratio would grow from
1.04 to 1.17 and the adjusted-income ratio from 1.28 to 1.44.
Most researcher would agree, I believe, that on average the elderly are at
least as well off as the nonelderly as measured by income,10 but, as the entries
in Table 10 suggest, the magnitude of the differential is not precisely
measured. From the point of view of public policy, however, precision is not
15required: if the elderly are as well off as the nonelderly, thereis little
reason for new policy that would transfer income to them. Policyshould
concentrate on the distribution of income among the elderly.
3.3. Distribution of Income.
Even though Social Security is an important source of income and it acts
strongly to reduce income inequality through the progressivity of theschedule
from lifetime earnings to benefits, income of the elderly appears to be more
unequally distributed than income of the nonelderly. Table 11 has Gini
coefficients of income and the percentage of income to the highest income
quintile. Although there is some variation by year, data set and income
measure, both inequality measures show more income inequality amongthe elderly
than among the nonelderly. The results from the 1973 Consumer Expenditure
Survey and the 1979 CPS (unadjusted) are based on the same income measureand
they yield about the same Gini coefficients. The adjustments to incomein the
1979 CPS reduce income inequality because the well-to-do have higher tax rates
and the poor receive a larger fraction of their budgets from nonmoney transfers.
The differences between the unadjusted and adjusted inequality measures are
greatest among the elderly because of the importance of Medicareand Medicaid.
The last three lines are based on consistent methods of measuring income in the
CPS: they embody the poverty scale size adjustment for household size discussed
earlier. They verify increasing inequality from 1979 to 1984 especially among
the nonelderly, as was found in Table 9.
Income levels, sources of income and the changes in income by source are
very different for the highest and lowest quintiles. Table 12shows that the
lowest quintile had about 8% of the income of the highest quintile in 1967;
about 13% in 1979 and 12% in 1984.11 Earnings in the lowest quintile were
16negligible. For this group, Social Security benefits were the only important
source of income, and benefit increases were the main reason for increasing
income: of the $1870 change in real income between 1967 and 1984, 81% was due
to increases in Social Security benefits. Real earnings of the highest quintile
fell over the 17-year period, but the other components of income increased
sharply. Social Security benefits increased by a factor of 2.5, which is a
higher rate than the rate of the lowest quintile. The category "Other" is, for
the highest quintile, mostly pensions.
The growth in Social Security benefits, especially between 1967 and 1973,
is at least partly due to an upward shift in the benefit schedule, partly to
earlier retirement (which causes a shift in income from earnings to Social
Security benefits), and partly to increasing lifetime contributions of each
cohort. Table 13 gives Social Security benefits of the cohort born in 1893-1897
which, except for mortality, holds constant lifetime earnings. Because most
people had retired by age 70, it also eliminates much of the retirement effect
on benefits. Thus, most of the change will be due to changes in the benefit
schedule.
Between 1967 and January, 1972 the benefit schedule was changed to increase
benefits by 43% holding lifetime earnings constant. A further increase in
September, 1972 raised the total change from 1967 to 72%. Total inflation over
the period was about 25%. In Table 13 mean real benefits increased by about 36%
(38% for the fifth decile) between 1967 and 1972, which is consistent with the
changes in the benefit schedule. Following the increase in 1972, benefits have
been indexed, so any increases in average benefits after retirement come from
compositional effects. (For example, the poor die sooner than the well-to-do,
so average benefits will rise with age.) The table shows, again, the importance
of Social Security benefits, especially for the very elderly: in 1982 they were
70%ofthe income of 85-89 year-olds.
173.4. Poverty
The poverty rate of the elderly is an aspectof income distribution that
has been the object of considerable study probablybecause until recently it has
been high and because poverty is especiallytroubling for the elderly. They
have few ways to recover from a loss of income, so afall into poverty tends to
be permanent.
The poverty rate is the fraction of a populationwhose incomes fall below
the poverty line, which varies by age andhousehold composition. The poverty
line for a single elderly person was $5,447 in 1987;it was $6,871 for an
elderly couple.I suspect that most people would regard the povertyline as low
indeed, and that someone with income substantiallyabove the poverty line is
still poor.
Table 14 shows that, in line with the increases in income,the poverty
rates of the elderly have declined sharply. By1984 they were lower than the
poverty rates of the nonelderly, and theyremained lower through 1987.12 As
reference to Table 12 shows, the Social Security system canclaim a major role
in the rather remarkablereduCtiOn of poverty amongthe elderly. The decline
was largest for the oldest. Yet their povertyrate remains high for reasons
connected with widowhood, as will be discussed below.
Putting a value on nonmoney income transfersincreases income measures of
the elderly considerably, which should lead to a largereduction in poverty
rates. The following table shows that to bethe case.
18Poverty Rates in 1979, percent
Household Household
Money Income plus Money Income plus
food and housing food, housing and medical
Household
Money IncomeMarket Recioiertt MarketReciDient
<65 10.6 8.9 9.0 6.7 8.3
65+ 14.7 12.9 13.7 4.5 7.0
Source:Smeeding, 1982
The table has poverty rates by age for various income measures.'3 The market
measure values nonmoney transfers at cost; the recipient measure values them at
an estimate of their value to the recipient)4 Including food and housing
transfers in income reduces poverty modestly for both elderly and nonelderly.
Due to the size of Medicare and Medicaid, however, including medical transfers
has a large effect: if medical transfers are valued at market cost, the poverty
rate of the elderly was 4.5% in 1979. In my view, the size of the transfer is
so large (about $1,344 in 1979 dollars), especially in relation to the income
levels of the poor elderly, that any poverty rates based on augmented income are
bound to be only suggestive.15 Nonetheless, th implicit transfers in the
Medicare and Medicaid program are large and certainly they are of value to the
poor elderly. The transfers have continued to grow much faster than the rate of
inflation (they grew by about 36% in real terms between 1979 and 1984),
suggesting that the poverty rates of the elderly in Table 14, which were already
below the poverty rates of the nonelderly, would be substantially below
following some adjustment for nonmoney income transfers.
The poverty rate of elderly widows has also declined, but it remains
considerably higher than the poverty rates of the population and of the rest of
the elderly. Some of the poverty is undoubtedly due to the high fraction of the
19very elderly that are widows:cet,par. one would expect the very elderly to be
poor simply because they mustfinance a longer lifetime of consumption from a
given lifetime wealth. Table15 shows, however, that the explanation is more
complicated. It is true that widows aged 72and over had higher poverty rates
than widows aged 65-71; but younger widows had povertyrates at least as high.
One explanation is differential mortality by incomelevel: husbands in
poor families die sooner thanhusbands in well-to-do families. For example, in
the R}1S the poverty rate in 1969 of couples whosurvived intact during the
entire ten years of the R}tS was 7.6%. The poverty ratein 1969 of couples in
which the husband eventually died during the ten yearsof the R}IS was 11.7%
(Holden, Burkhauser and Myers, 1986). One mightthink the difference in poverty
rates is caused by health expenditures in theseveral years before the husband's
death; but the association with poverty in 1969 andeventual widowhood lasts
over many years. For example, the poverty ratein 1969 of couples in which the
husband died between 1977 and 1979 was 9.2%, again comparedwith 7.6% for
couples intact between 1969 and 1979.
Mortality rates are also associated with wealthlevels (Table 16). couples
in the 1977 RIIS were divided into two groups: thosewho survived intact between
197] and 1979 (surviving couples) and those in whichthe husband died between
1977 and 1979 (widowed couples). The table gives median
wealth in each of the
six R1{S surveys (covering the years 1969 to 1979) bythat classification. All
the wealth categories show that the surviving coupleshad higher wealth than the
widowed couples as early as 1969, more than eight yearsbefore the husband
died)6 These results imply that the widowed couple would have had fewer assets
had the husband survived, and, therefore, would have had a higherprobability of
being in povertyJ7The causes of the differential mortality are not known,
but there is some indication that lifetime health differences play arole.
Table 16 shows that Social Security wealth and pension wealth,both of which are
20good summaries of lifetime earnings, were higher for the surviving couples.18
This suggests that lifetime health differences affect both lifetime earnings and
mortality rates after retirement, causing the observed correlation.
Beyond differential mortality the transition to widowhood itself seems to
induce poverty. Table 17 gives poverty rates by marital transition between 1975
and 1977 for the entire sample of 1975 couples and for the 1975 couples not in
poverty in 1975. The table shows that widowed couples (1975-1977) had somewhat
but not greatly higher poverty rates than the other couples in the years before
the husbands died. However, in the first survey year after the husbands deaths
the poverty rate of the surviving widows rose to 42% while the poverty rate of
the intact couples was just 7%. Other calculations (not given here) show that
the average increase in poverty following widowhood was 30%. The increase is
partly due to income mismeasureinent associated with the husband's death
(Burkhauser, Holden and Myers, 1986), but mostly due to permanent changes in
economic resources as shown by the high poverty rate in 1979. The two right-
hand columns give poverty of couples that were above the poverty line in 1975.
37% of the surviving widows, none of whom had been in poverty in 1975, were in
poverty in 1977.
One might well imagine that much of the increase in poverty at the
husband's death is due to the termination of his earnings. Apparently, however,
this is not the case: using RHS data Burkhauser, Holden and Feaster (1988)
studied the determinants of the hazard of poverty of widows, the probability of
entering poverty among those not already in poverty. Only 10.1% of the
transitions into poverty were associated with the loss of the husband's
earnings. About two-thirds of the cases were associated with widowhood itself
and with a decline in nonwage income, particularly Social Security. Even after
the husband's retirement (so that he had no earnings), the probability of a
transition into poverty when the husband dies is high (Holden, Burkhauser and
21Feaster, 1988)
Changes in the components of wealth atthe husband's death provide some
explanation for the high poverty ratesof widows. Among the widowed couples,
wealth in all the categories declined between 1977 and1979 (Table lG).19
Similar calculations over all transition years in the R}ISshow that total median
wealth declined by 31% during the years of the husband's death comparedwith an
increase of 2% over the same years among surviving couples.Most of the loss is
in Social Security wealth, which is to be expected: accordingto the Social
Security rules the couple's benefit is reducedwhen the husband dies. For
couples of this age and cohort the typical reductionwould be about 33% of the
couple's benefit. Because the poverty line of a singleelderly person is just
21% below the poverty line of an elderly couple, the differencein the changes
in Social Security benefits and the poverty line willitself cause some widows
to become poor. There is no particular reason tobelieve that either factor
properly reflects returns to scale in consumption:both are arbitrary.
Table 16 shows that pension wealth declines sharply whenthe husband dies:
at the time of the RHS most husbands did not have pensionswith survivorship
rights (Myers, Burkhauser and Maiden, 1986). TheRetirement Equity Act of 1984
is meant to encourage the choice of a pension with survivorship rights.
Previously the pension beneficiary (typically the husband)could choose a
pension with no survivorship rights. Since 1984 the pensionwill have
survivorship rights unless both the husband and the wife requestotherwise.
Simulations over the RIIS population show that changing all pensions tohave
survivorship rights would have raised substantially the incomesof those widows
whose husbands had pensions without survivor's benefits. However, the poverty
rate of all widows would have been remained high, about 22%, comparedwith 26%
before the change. The effect on the poverty rate was small for two reasons:
first, about 30% of pensions had survivor's benefits already; second,there is
22a strong positive association between economic status and pension eligibility,
so that few of the poor widows would have been eligible for pension benefits
even with sur-vivorship rights. This general result should carry over to the
population. It is hard to see that survivorship rights to pensions will have a
large impact on the high poverty rates of widows.
The causes of the high rates of poverty among elderly widows are varied and
complex. Some families reach retirement already poor or near poor. Were the
husband to survive the family would have a high risk of poverty, but. because
husbands in poor families tend to die sooner than husbands in wealthy families,
often the widow inherits the family's poverty. In addition some sources of
income drop when the husband dies and some wealth is reduced. How much poverty
is due to the spending of assets as an individual ages is not clear. Cross-
section poverty rates have cohort effects: the oldest are from cohorts that had
lower lifetime earnings. We need panel data over, say, 20 years to control for
cohort effects: we could then observe the life cycle effects.
3.5. Wealth.
Although income is practically the only measure of economic status in use,
life cycle considerations suggest that, at least for the retired elderly, wealth
is a better measure because it measures consumption opportunities. However, the
kinds of intergenerational comparisons that are based on income cannot easily be
made using wealth because a large fraction of the wealth of workers is future
earnings, which are not observed. Even wealth comparisons among the retired
elderly of different ages are not straightforward because of variation in life
expectancy: for example, who is better off, a 70 year-old with $100,000 or an
80 year-old with $50,000? One could, of course, calculate the annuity each
could purchase to translate the comparison into income terms, but the
23consumption path implied by the annuity might not be the desired path.Another
method would be to ask whether the 70 year-old he would have more or less than
$50,000 should he life to 80. This involves finding the optimal consumption
path. Although there has been some research on consumption pathsof the elderly
(to be discussed later), the research is not well-enough advanced to make
confident comparisons based on the estimated paths. Notwithstanding these
problems of comparison, wealth data are a valuable alternative or supplement to
income data.
The following table has estimates of average bequeathable wealth of the
elderly.
20
1983 SCF 1983 SCF
1984 SIN' without supplementwith supplement
Mean 91,000 106,000 250,000
Median 60,000 n.a. 52,000
Sources: SCF with supplement: Avery and Elliehausen, 1986; SCF without
supplement: Avery, Elliehausen, Canner and Gustafson, 1984; SIPP: Radner,1989.
Both the Survey of Program Participation (SIPP) and the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) without supplement are self-weighting samples.21 The estimates
of mean wealth differ somewhat but they are probably not significantly
different. (Given the typical dispersion of wealth, the standard errors are
bound to be very large.) The SCF with supplement differs from the SCF without
supplement by the addition of 438 high incomehouseholds.22 Even though both of
the SCF estimates of mean wealth are weighted by the sampling weights, so that,
in principle, the means should be the same, the estimates are widely different.
This happens because wealth is so highly concentrated. (The Cmi coefficient in
24the wealth of the elderly is 0.78 from the SCF with supplement (McDermed, Clark
and Allen, 1987), whereas the Cmi coefficient of income is about 0.35. The
fraction of wealth in the top 1% of the wealth distribution is about 35%) The
high concentration of wealth, makes it difficult to find wealth measures that
represent the situation of most of the elderly. An alternative to the mean is,
of course, the median. But it has drawbacks for studying the sources of wealth,
which has been an important research topic: the medians of the wealth
components cannot be aggregated and some categories will have medians of zero.
For these reasons and for comparability with the RMS and other data sets (which
are self-weighting), I analyze mean wealth from the SCF without supplement and
from the SIPP.
Mean wealth of the elderly was about $100,000 in these data sets. This
does not include a few asset categories such as consumer durables, but much more
important from the point of view of describing available resources it does not
include any claim on Social Security, pensions or Medicare/Medicaid. At a real
interest rate of 3% the assets add just $3,000 per year to income from other
sources. This is about 18% of the average household income of the elderly in
1983 ($16,386). Should an elderly person consume part of the wealth as he ages,
the wealth could make a much higher contribution to consumption. Suppose, for
example, a 70 year-old woman chose a flat consumption over 15 years, which is
about her life expectancy. At a real interest rate of 3%, she could consume
$8,300 per year (1983$) from the wealth. This is about 51% of average income in
1983. Of course, a flat consumption path is probably not optimal (she might
live to 86), but the example implies that, on average, wealth accumulation for
retirement is adequate, provided the wealth is consumed.
To form a complete picture of the resources of the elderly we need more
inclusive wealth measures than are available from either the SCF or the SIPP.
Table 18 has fully inclusive average net wealth from the 1975 and 1979 RHS. The
25ages of most of the headsof households were 64-69 in 1975 and 68-73 in 1979, so
the table shows wealth near the beginning of retirement.In fact, future
earnings accounted for only 6% of wealth in1975 and 3% in 1979, so, practically
speaking, the sample had retired by 1979.Financial wealth includes stocks and
bonds, savings accounts and so forth. Flows (all butthe first three entries)
are converted to stocks through actuarial discounting,either real or nominal
depending on the flow.SSI. is Supplemental Security Income, a means-tested old
age welfare program. Transfersincludes transfers from relatives and children.
Medicare and Medicaid is the expected present value of the perhousehold
transfer through the Medicare and. Medicaid program evaluated at cost,the market
value discussed earlier.23
The average wealth levels are reasonably high and consistentwith
independent measures of income andwealth.24 I imagine, however, that most
people would be surprised at how little saving isin the conventional form of
financial, business and property wealth: about 22% in 1975 and23% in 1979.
Adding in housing equity to find the fraction of savingthat takes place at the
household level brings these figures to 36% and 41%. Pensionsand Social
Security, which are savings done by firms and society onbehalf of the
household, accounted for 46% in 1975. Both in levels and as percentagesof
total wealth, the sum of pensions and Social Security fell between1975 and 1979
because of higher mortality discounting as the R}IS sample aged, and,in the case
of pensions, because inflation reduced the real value. Undoubtedly,for the
same reasons I discussed earlier in connection with thevaluation of the income
flow from Medicare and Medicaid, the most controversial entry isthe wealth
value of Medicare and Medicaid.25 It accounted for 10% of wealth in1975 and
12% in 1979.26 Its value rose between 1975 and 1979 despite the agingof the
RHS population (the actuarial discounting is higher at greater ages)because
the growth in Medicare and Medicaid transfers was much higherthan the inflation
26rate.
The level of wealth in the lowest wealth decile is low indeed, and consists
almost entirely of wealth from public programs. Any underreporting is not
likely to be substantial because most underreporting is associated with
financial assets; but even allowing for some, it is clear that many elderly
reach retirement with very little. Research has not discovered why this
happens.
27Notes
1. An additional reason for this difference isthat women tend to marry older
men.
2. A households is classified as elderly if the"householder" is elderly;
earnings can come from a nonelderly spouse.
3. In much of this section I use averages or other summarymeasures. The
elderly are a very diverse population, however, sothe averages will mask the 4.
Although the consumption bundles of the elderlyand the nonelderly are somewhat
different, a Laspayres index based on the consumptionbundle of the elderly has
varied little from the CPI over either short or long time periods(Boskin and
Hurd, 1985; Bridges and Packard, 1982). Therefore,I use the CPI to convert
nominal dollars to real dollars unless the original researchused some other
index.
5. The poverty scaling is rather arbitrarily based on food consumptionin 1955
(Palmer, Smeeding and Jencks, 1988).
6. In 1984 average hourly real nonagricultural earnings werealmost exactly the
same as in 1967. Table B-44, 1988 Economic Reportof the President.
7. The table does not show the experience of any cohort; it measureschanges
in the means of the deciles of each age interval.
8. There was, of course, some change in composition due to mortalitybetween
1979 and 1984, which probably tended to increase average income.This issue
will be discussed later in connection with age-related wealth changes.
9. The validation study used outside information from Social Securityand IRS
records to check the accuracy of income items in the 1973 CPS.
10. In addition to the studies already discussed, see Boskin andShoven (1987);
Danziger et. al. (1984a, l984b); Hurd and Shoven (1982,1984); Ross Danziger
and Smolensky (1987).
11. Income is observed cash income from the CPS adjusted forhousehold size
Iaccording to the poverty scale.
12. In 1987 thepovertyrate of the elderly was 12.2% and of the population was
13.5%. This more recent data does not have the age detail of Table 14.
13. The entries under money income vary from the official poverty levels (and
front the levels in Table 14) because of difference is weighting.
14. The method aims to find the expenditures the recipient family would have
made, given its characteristics and income, if it had purchased the nonmoney
transfers in markets. The ratio of the estimated expenditures to the market
value of the transfers in the benefit weight. The benefit weight for Medicare
and Medicaid transfers is 0.42 (Smeeding, 1982).
IS. For example, it seems unlikely that if a two-person elderly household at
the poverty line ($4,400) were given an additional $1,344 and the opportunity to
buy into the Medicare and Medicaid program, it would choose to spend the full
$1,344 in such a way.
16. Table 16 is an example of many similar results obtained when the
classification is by marital transition in other years.
17. Similar results have been obtained by Jianakoplos et al (1989) in the
National Longitudinal Survey of older men.
18.Agewill cause differences in the wealth measures of Social Security and
pensions because the discounting that converts the future flows tostocks rises
with age. But the wealth differences are too large to be caused by age
differences: the husbands in the widowed couples were about 0.35 yearolder
than the husbands in the surviving couples.
19. Earnings are not shown in the table: because the husbands were66-71 year
old in 1977, median earnings were zero.
20. Family unit wealth in the SCF; household wealth in the SIPP.
21. Wealth includes financial assets, real estate, and housing equity,all net
of debts. It excludes pension and Social Security wealth, the cashvalue of
2life insurance and household durables. The SCF also excludes the value of
automobiles and equity in small businesses and farms. The sample sizes are 3824
(SCF) and 18,700 (SIPP) all ages included.
22. Although weights are given for the high income households, it is by no
means clear that weighted averages are accurate: only 9% of the high income
families that were asked to participate in the survey responded that they would
participate. This raises obvious questions about the representativeness of the
sample.
23. This is the method used by Smeeding (1989), and by Clark, et. al. (1984).
24. For example, Smeeding (1989) calculates full income of the elderly to be
$13,423; if the wealth in 1979 were annuitized at a 7% interest rate and 4%
mortality rate, it would yield $16,137. Given that this applies to 68-73 year
olds who are more wealthy than older cohorts, the figures seem quite consistent.
Radner (1989) reports mean financial and housing wealth of 65-74 year-olds from
the SIPP to be $99,800, which is $69,700 in 1979 dollars. The comparable wealth
figure in the 1979 RES, when most heads of households were 68-73, is $71,100.
However, both the 81FF and the RHS wealth figures are substantially below the
SCF (without supplement) wealth figures: for 65-74 year-olds they are $91,300
in 1979 dollars.
25. The market valuation for most elderly may be fairly accurate: many elderly
purchase additional medical insurance beyond Medicare and Medicaid. This
indicates that, from Medicare and Medicaid alone, they are not at a corner
solution in their demand for medical coverage, and that, apart from wealth
effects, market valuation is appropriate. This argument would not hold for the
poor elderly many of whom do not purchase additional medical coverage (U.S.
Senate Special Committee on Aging).
26. These fractions are very close to the fraction of income from Medicare and
Medicaid (10%) in Smeeding (1989).
3Table I
Fraction of Population of Different Ages:
Actual, 1900—1980 and Predicted 1990—2050 (Middle Series)*
% aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged
55—5960—6465—6970—74 75+ 75—7980—84 85+
1900 3 2 2 1 1
1910 3 2 2 1 1
1920 3 3 2 1 1
1930 4 3 2 2 2
1940 4 4 3 2 2
1950 5 4 3 2 3
1960 5 4 3 3 3
1970 5 4 3 3 4
1980 5 4 4 3 4 2 1 1
% aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged % aged
55—5960—6465—6970—7475—7980—8485—8990—9495+
1990 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 0 0
2000 5 4 3 3 3 2 1 1 0
2010 7 6 4 3 2 2 1 1 0
2020 7 7 6 4 3 2 1 1 0
2030 6 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
2040 6 5 5 5 4 4 2 1 1
2050 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 1
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports Series P—25, No. 952.
Prolections of the potulation of the U.S.. by Aee. Sex. and Race. 1983—2080.
May 1984: table 6.























































Actual and Predicted Life Expectancy at Age 65
Source: Committee on Ways & Means, 1987.Table 3
Distribution of Living Arrangements of the Elderly, Men end Women (Percent)
With Non— With
Age 65+ Spouse Alone Relatives relatives TotalSpouse ________________ __________
1960 69 12 14 4 100
1970 71 15 10 4 100
1980 75 14 8 2 100
1985 75 15 7 2 100
Aye65—74
1960 75 11 10
1970 76 12* 8
1980 80 11 6
1985 79 12 6
Ase 75+
1960 57 15 22 7 100
1970 60 20* 16 6* 100
1980 66 21 11 4 100
1985 67 20 10 2 100
1985 Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports Series P—20,
No. 410, Marital Status and Living Arraneetents: March 1985, Table A—12.
1980 Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, PC8O—2—4B,
Living Arraneements of Children and Adults, Table 4 and Current Population
Reports, Series P—20, No. 3651, Marital Status and Livina Arranaements:
March 1980, Table 6.
1970 Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, PC(2)—4B,
Persons by Family Characteristics, Tables 2 and 11.
1960 Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population, PC(2)—4B,
Persons by Family Characteristics, Tables 2 and 15.





4 100 36 24 34
5 100 36 34 26
3 100 37 40 20
3 100 38 41 18
4 100 44 23 28
4* 100 45 31* 20
3 100 48 35 16
3 100 49 35 14
6 100 20 26 46
4* 100 21 37* 36
2 100 21 48 27






Mean Household Income of the Elderly and of
the Population, 1983 Dollars
Year Mean 65+ Mean All Ratio
1970 13,901 25,660 .54
1975 16,188 26,580 .61
1980 15,268 25,467 .60
1985 17,411 26,919 .65
1986 18,006 27,949 .64
Source:Money Income of Households, Families and Persons, Current
Population Reports. Series P—60, various years.Table 5
Distribution of Sources of Income (Percent)
1967 1976 1984 1986
Earnings 29 23 16 17
Social Security 34 39 38 38
Pensions & Other
Retirement 15 16 15 16
Assets 15 18 28 26
Public Assistance 4 2 1 1
Other 3 2 2 2
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Retirernent Income for an Aging Population" and "Income of the
Population 55 & Over, 1986", Current Population Reports.Table 6
Percentage Distribution of Elderly Households by Importance of Income Source
1971 1980 1986
A. Earnings
Total Percent 100 100 100
0 69 78 81
1—49 16 12 11
50—100 15 10 8
90—100 5 2 2
B. Social Security
Total Percent 100 100 100
0 13 9 8
1—49 38 32 35
50—100 49 59 57
90—100 17 23 24
C. Private Pensions & Annuities
Total Percent 100 100 100
0 83 79 74
1—19 6 10 13
20—49 8 9 11
50—100 3 2 2
D. Government Pensions
Total Percent 100 100 100
0 94 89 87
1—49 3 7 8
50—100 3 4 5
E. Income from Assets
Total Percent 100 100 100
0 51 41 40
1—19 27 33 30
20—49 15 17 18
50—100 7 9 12
Sources: Income of the population aged 60 and older, Social Security
Administration, various years.Table 7
Labor Force Participation Rates (Percent)
Men Women
Source: Labor Force Statistics Derived from the CPS, 1948—1987. U.S. Department
of Labor, bureau of Labor Statistics, #2307, August, 1988.
*Notavailable
Year55—59 60—64 65—69 70—7475+ 55—59 60—64 65—69 70—7475+
1957 91.482.952.6** 38.230.317.5* *
1965 90.2 78.043.024.814.1 47.134.017.4 9.1 3.7
1970 89.575.041.625.212.0 49.036.117.39.1 3.4
1975 89.465.5 31.7 21.110.1 47.933.214.57.6 3.0
1980 81.760.828.517.9 8.8 48.533.215.17.5 2.5
1985 79.6 55.624.514.9 7.0 50.333.413.57.6 2.2
1987 79.7 54.925.814.7 7.1 52.233.214.36.8 2.4Table 8
Growth in Average Real Family Unit Income
Annual Income Growth (%) Income in
1967—1979 1979—1984 1984*
A. No Size Adjustment
Under 65 1.0 —0.4 27,464
65+ 1.5 3.4 18,279
B.Size Adjustment
Under 65 1.7 0.5 16,293
65+ 2.2 3.7 14,160
65—69 1.8 3.8 16,496
70—74 2.1 4.2 14,401
75—79 3.0 3.1 12,617
80—84 2.9 3.3 11,469
85+ 2.7 5.5 11,825
Source: Radner (1987)
*Measuredin 1982 dollars.Table 9
Annual Percentage Change of Average Real Family Unit Income
Adjusted for Size
2nd deci].e 9th decile
Age of Head 1967—79 1979—84 1967—79 1979—84
20—24 0.9 —7.4 1.3 —2.4
25—29 0.3 —4.4 1.7 0.8
30—34 1.8 —3.3 2.6 0.6
35—39 1.5 —1.6 2.7 1.5
40—44 1.7 —2.2 2.3 2.0
45—49 1.0 —1.3 1.9 2.4
50—54 1.2 —2.2 1.9 1.6
55—59 2.2 —2.6 2.4 0.9
60—64 2.5 0.5 1.9 0.4
65—69 3.2 3.7 1.5 3.1
70—74 3.2 2.0 2.0 4.5
75—79 4.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
80—84 4.2 1.9 2.1 4.1
85+ 5.5 1.2 2.5 8.0
Age 15—64 1.1 —2.8 1.9 1.1
Age 65+ 3.6 2.3 1.8 3.7
Source: Radner (1987).Table 10
Income of the Elderly Relative to the Nonelder].y, 1979
Income Adjustedincome
Poverty Budget PovertyBudget
Line Share Per Line Share Per
Household Index Index caoita Household Index Index capita








Note: Entries are the ratios of household incomes of the elderly to the nonelderly.
Source: Smeeding (1989), and authors calculations.Table 11
Distribution of Income
Percent of Income
Year, Data Cmi Coefficients to uver income ouintjle
and Income Measure Ae < 65 Ae 65 Age < 65 Aze ￿ 65
1973 Consumer
Expenditure Survey' 0.36 0.44 40.4 49.8
1979 CPS2 0.35 0.43 40.6 49.5
1979 CPS; Adjusted3 0.31 0.35 37.2 42.8
1967 CPS; Family
Size Adjustment' 0.36 0.42 41.6 51.6
1979 CPS; Family
Size Adjustment' 0.36 0.40 41.3 47.1
1984 CPS; Family
Size Adjustment' 0.40 0.42 44.2 48.1
Danziger et.al. 1984a. Household income.
2Smeeding,1989. Household income.
Smeeding, 1989. Household income adjusted for nonmoney income, taxes and
employment—related income as in Table 10, 8, "Income", "Household".
'Radner,1987, Familyunitincome. Size adjustment based on poverty scale.Table 12
Average Family Unit Income of the Elderly by Source of Income,




Lowest 1967 2,116 54 1,589 107 366
1979 3,484 65 2,694 142 583
1984 3,986 73 3,102 168 643
Highest 1967 23,572 14,352 2,344 4,801 2,076
1979 27,79810,379 4,811 8,047 4,561
1984 34,061 9,450 5,901 13,289 5,421
Source: Radner (1987) Table 14.
Table 13
Social Security Income of
Faintly Units (1982 $)Adjustedfor Size
All Deciles Fifth Decile
Social Security Percent Social Security Percent
Ae and Year Income of Total Income of Total
70—74; 1967 2,850 31 3,320 55
75—79; 1972 3,880 37 4,570 67
80—84; 1977 4,330 38 4,960 71
85—89; 1982 4,560 37 5,270 70
Source: Radner (1987).Source: Radner
Table 14
PovertyRates of Family Units









1976 22.8 22.9 23.3
1981 26.2 27.2 25.4





Sources: Current Population Reports, Series P—60,various years.
Age 1967
Under65 11.8 11.1 14.5
65 + 28.1 15.1 12.4
65—69 21.9 12.2 9.4
70—74 25.8 13.4 11.5
75—79 33.8 17.9 13.7
80—84 38.2 19.4 17.7
Year 60—61 62—64 Total 22±Table 16
Median Wealth by Change in Marital Status between 1977 and 1979
(Thousands of 1979 $)
bequethable Social Pensions and
Becuethable Wealth Plus Housing Security Annuities
Marital CoupleCouple CoupleCoupleCoupleCoupleCoupleCouple
Transition to to to to to to to to
1977—1979: CoupleWidow CoupleWidow CoupleWidow CoupleWidow
1969 11.9 10.2 38.7 31.8 49.3 48.4 26.0 21.3
1971 13.8 11.5 41.7 34.6 64.0 62.9 39.3 3l.
1973 13.010.4 43.3 36.8 73.770.1 27.0 23.7
1975 15.9 12.4 47.8 41.7 69.4 64.2 20.4 19.3
1977* 15.6 11.5 48.8 47.2 67.8 63.2 23.1 19.4
1979* 16.0 9.8 51.2 45.0 61.0 38.6 16.2 7.0
*Husbandin "couple to widow" columns died between these years.
Source: Hurd and Wise, 1989 and author's calculations from the RIIS.
Table17
Poverty Rates(Percent)
EntireSamole Not Poor in 1975
Couple Couple Couple Couple
Year to couole to widow to couule to widow
1969 5 8 3 5
1971 7 11 4 7
1973 8 8 4 4
1975* 8 9 0 0
1977* 7 42 4 37
1979 11 40 11 35
*Husbandin "couple to widow" columns died between these years
Source: Unpublished calculations of Hurd and Wise from the PBSTable 18
Average Household Wealth and the Distribution of Wealth by Source, 1975 and
1979 R.}iS Sample
1975 1979 Lowest Wealth Decile 1979
WealthPercent WealthPercent Wealth Percent
Housing 22.4 14 26.9 18 1.4 4
Business &
Property 11.0 7 11.6 8 1.1 3
Financial 23.2 15 22.5 15 0.7 2
Pensions 23.2 15 18.0 12 1.6 4
SSI, Welfare
& Transfers 2.7 2 2.3 2 3.6 10
Medicare—
Medicaid 15.8 10 17.7 12 11.9 34
Social
Security 48.4 31 44.0 30 14.2 40
Future
Earnings 9.6 6 3.9 3 1.0 3
TOTAL 156.3 100 146.7 100 35.5 100
Notes: Wealth in thousands of 1979 dollars.
Based on 7483 (1975) and 6610 (1979) observations from the R}IS.
Farm families and farm wealth excluded.
Source: Rurd and Shoven, 1985.References
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